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1 Introduction
At the time labour unions were established, economies were in many respect
more closed than nowadays. In a couple of decades, unions’ position have
been dramatically weakened and wage inequality has increased.1 The govern-
ments in many countries have deregulated the labour market to undermine
or reduce union power in wage bargaining. We examine here the relationship
of governments, unions, technological change and economic integration.
Labour unions and employer federations have two roles which are often
mixed in economic debates: (i) they bargain over wages and (ii) lobby the
government for a number of issues (e.g. pension schemes, hiring and firing
costs, hours of work). To avoid confusion in this matter, this study concen-
trates wholly on role (i) and assumes that labour unions and employer feder-
ations attempt to improve their members’ welfare through wage settlement.
Political lobbying is ignored here and the author considers it elsewhere.2
Although it is widely known that deunionization removes the wage com-
pression imposed by unions and increase inequality among workers,3 there
is still no theory of deunionization. We take the ’Schumpeterian’ growth
model,4 in which firms can step forward in the quality ladders of technology
by R&D, as a starting point, but replace the competitive labour market by
wage bargaining in which unions and employers observe the effect of wages
on both employment and investment. We also assume that the government
can influence union power e.g. by legislation or compulsory intermediation.
Our results suggest that intensified competition in the goods markets due to
economic integration is the likely cause for the observed deunionization.
Many papers show that the relationship of labour unions and economic
1In the US, in 1980 the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the distribution of
male weekly wages was 2.7, and 24% of all private sector workers were unionized. By 1990,
the ratio has risen to 3.5 and only 12% of the private sector workers were unionized (Juhn
et. al., 1993, Farber and Krueger 1992). In the UK, the ratio of the 90-10 wage differential
was 2.4 and increased to 3.1 in 1990, while union density among male workers was 54% in
1980, and fell to 3.1 in 1990 (Gosling and Machin 1995). Cf. also Acemoglu et. al. (2001).
2Using a common agency framework, Palokangas (2003) considers unions and employers
as lobbies trying to influence the self-interested government.
3There is a lot of evidence that unions compress the structure of wages (cf. DiNardo
et. al. (1996), Card 1996, and Fortin and Lemieux 1997). Cf. also Acemoglu et. al. (2001).
4Cf. e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991) (in ch. 4), Aghion and Howitt (1998), and
Wa¨lde (1999).
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growth depends significantly on the production structure of the economy.
Peretto (1998) examines the growth effects of union bargaining power by a
product-variety model. His main result is that a fall in union power promotes
R&D and growth through a higher profit margin. Peretto however assumes
that (i) labour is employed only in production, (ii) final goods can be directly
converted into R&D, (iii) labour unions completely ignore the effect of their
wages on productivity through R&D, and (iv) union power is exogenous. We,
on the contrary, assume that labour is used both in production and R&D,
unions take into account also the effects through R&D, and union power can
be changed through labour market reforms.
Dinopoulos and Zhao (2003) examine the interaction of union power and
globalization. They as well assume that labour unions ignore the effect of
their wages on productivity through R&D. A salient feature of their model
is that a union’s utility is postulated as a geometric average of the wage and
employment. They show that macroeconomic effects of globalization depend
decisively on the relative weight of the wage in union preferences. We, on the
contrary, prefer to stick to microfoundations and to derive union preferences
from workers’ preferences and seniority as follows. The workers differ in their
probability of employment. The higher seniority a worker has, the less likely
he loses his job when aggregate employment falls. Because union members
vote for the management, the latter’s utility is determined by the median
member’s preferences.
There are already many papers that suggest that expensive labour may
speed up economic growth. Cahuc and Michel (1996) (using an OLG model),
as well as Agell and Lommerud (1997) (using an extensive game framework)
show that a minimum wage may create an incentive for workers to accumu-
late human capital. Palokangas (1996, 2000) introduces wage bargaining into
Romer’s (1990) product-variety model with skilled and unskilled workers. He
shows that higher union bargaining power leads to higher wages for unskilled
workers, higher unemployment for both skilled and unskilled workers in pro-
duction, a lower wage for skilled workers. This decreases costs in R&D and
promotes growth. All these papers, however, ignore the uncertainty that is
embodied in technological change. To eliminate this shortcoming, we use
here a Schumpeterian model of creative destruction.
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The author uses a Schumpeterian model of creative destruction for prob-
lems of growth and trade also in two other papers. Palokangas (2004a)
examines the growth and welfare effects of union power in a model where
research firms learn from each other. It shows that the international coordi-
nation of labour market policy raises the workers’ wages and promotes growth
and welfare. Palokangas (2004b) examines the growth and welfare effects of
the expansion of common markets when the labour markets are perfect but
economies differ in the productivity of R&D. It shows that a small economy
with low incentives to save do not growth at all, if left alone, but avoids
stagnation if its R&D is productive enough to join a common market with a
positive growth rate. In this study, we focus on two problems: the expansion
strategy of a unionized common market and the effects of economic integra-
tion on the political economy of labour market regulation/deregulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
the institutional background of the model. The basic structures of the model
are presented in section 3. Section 4 considers a household’s consumption
and saving as a problem of stochastic dynamic programming. It results in
the savings and investment functions for the economies.5 Section 5 examines
wage bargaining and Section 6 the growth and welfare effects of integration.
2 The setting
There is a common market with a given number J of member economies.
Each of these economies contains one unit of land and a fixed number of
similar households.6 Competitive firms in the common market produce the
consumption good from intermediate goods of all member economies. Inter-
mediate-good firms in the common market are strategically interdependent.
They are oligopolists which form expectations on each other’s responses.
5The study focuses entirely on the households’ stationary equilibrium in which the
allocation of resources is invariable across technologies, and ignores the behaviour of the
system during the transitional period before the equilibrium is reached. In this study, the
growth model is based on a Poisson process. This means that if the initial state is chosen
outside a stationary equilibrium, then the model would most likely generate cycles, which
are technically extremely difficult to cope with.
6The purpose of this admittedly strong assumption is to allow us to make welfare
comparisons, which would be extremely problematic with heterogeneous households.
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All households are modelled as dynastic families which are risk averters
and share identical preferences. The members of such a family can be either
workers, who are employed in production, or researchers, who are employed
in R&D. Family-optimization considerations determine the evolution of con-
sumption expenditure over time, the allocation of savings across shares in dif-
ferent firms, and the decision whether a family member becomes a researcher
or enters the labour force as a worker. A single family takes macroeconomic
variables (e.g. prices, wages, profits and employment) as given.
In this framework, economic integration is equivalent to the increase in
the size J of the common market. This increases the variety of products and
intensifies the competition between the intermediate-good producers.
The structure of economy j ∈ {1, ..., J} can be characterized as follows:
(i) One monopolist at a time produces the economy-specific intermediate
good by workers. Several firms do R&D by using researchers and fi-
nance their expenditure by issuing shares. A research firm’s technology
is a random variable but the probability of its improvement in one unit
of time is an increasing function of its investment in R&D. When a
research firm in economy j is successful, it uses its new technology to
drive the old producer out and starts producing good j itself. Its profits
are then distributed among those who had financed it. When R&D is
not successful for a firm, there is no profit and the ex post value of a
share of the firm is zero.
(ii) The households decide their labour supply before entering the labour
market. They save in shares in research firms of their home economies.
(iii) The workers are unionized and differ in seniority which affects the prob-
ability of employment. The labour union is able to control the whole
of the intermediate good industry, including potential entrants, so that
the change of the incumbent producer does not affect the union’s bar-
gaining position. Because the union’s management is chosen by voting,
its instantaneous utility is the median member’s expected income. In
wage bargaining, the labour union attempts to maximize the discounted
value of the flow of its instantaneous utility and the employer federation
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the discounted value of the flow of the employers’ profits.7
(iv) Direct subsidy to R&D is commonly non-feasible.8 Given this, the gov-
ernment regulates union power as a second-best policy.
The growth model is based on a Poisson process. We focus entirely on
the households’ stationary equilibrium in which the allocation of resources is
invariable across technologies, and ignore the behaviour of the system during
the transitional period before the equilibrium is reached. If the initial state
is chosen outside a stationary equilibrium, then the model would most likely
generate cycles, which are technically extremely difficult to cope with.
3 The model
(a) Consumption-good firms. There is one consumption good in the common
market and its price is normalized at unity. The representative consumption-
good firm in the common market makes its output C from the quantity nk of
the intermediate goods and the quantity ak of land throughout all economies
k by CES technology as follows:
C =
[ J∑
k=1
B
1−1/θ
k
(
n
1−1/θ
k + γa
1−1/θ
k
)]θ/(θ−1)
,
(1)
where θ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution and Bk the productivity
parameter in economy k. The firm maximizes its profit taking the prices of
7Some papers assume that the expected wage outside the firm is the union’s reference
point, but this is not quite in line with the microfoundations of the alternating offers
game. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) state (pp. 177, 185-6) that the the
reference income should not be identified with the outside option point. Rather, despite
the availability of these options, it remains appropriate to identify the reference income
with the income streams accruing to the parties in the course of the dispute. For example,
if the dispute involves a strike, these income streams are the employee’s income from
temporary work, union strike funds, and similar sources, while the employer’s income
might derive from temporary arrangements that keeps the business running.
8It is commonly suggested that in order to eliminate the externality due to R&D, the
government should directly subsidize R&D. In reality, however, R&D is mostly carried
out by research departments of companies that are also producing other goods, so that
the government cannot completely distinguish between inputs being used in R&D and
production. If R&D were subsidized, then it were in the interests of both employers and
labour unions to hide costs of production under R&D expenditure and share the subsidy.
For this discussion, see Palokangas (2000), chapter 8.
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intermediate goods, pk, and rents Rk throughout all economies k as given.
This yields the equilibrium conditions
pj = ∂C/∂nj = B
1−1/θ
j (C/nj)
1/θ, Rj/pj = γ(nj/aj)
1/θ
. (2)
Because economy j contains one unit of land, in equilibrium there must be
aj = 1. (3)
(b) Intermediate-good firms. There is one firm at a time as the incumbent
producer of good j. It anticipates the reaction of the producers of the other
goods k 6= j by the function
C = Φ(nj, J), φ(J)
.
=
nj
Φ
∂Φ
∂nj
< 1, φ′ > 0. (4)
The more there are competitors (i.e. the higher J), the more difficult it is to
raise the price above unit cost (i.e. the higher the elasticity φ). One unit of
intermediate good j is produced from one labour unit. The incumbent firm
takes workers’ wage wj, aggregate consumption in the common market, C,
and the productivity Bj as given and maximizes its profit
pij
.
= pjnj − winj (5)
by its labour input nj subject to the inverse demand function in (2) and
its expectations (4). Without potential competition from new entrants, the
first-order condition of this maximization is given by
wj = pj + nj
∂pj
∂nj
= pj +
pj
θ
(yj
Φ
∂Φ
∂yj
− 1
)
=
[
1 +
φ(J)− 1
θ
]
pj.
This yields the monopoly price pmj
.
= θ/[θ + φ(J)− 1]. Each new generation
of good j provides constant ε > 1 times as many services as the product of
the generation before it. if the previous incumbent, whose productivity is
1/ε times the productivity of the current incumbent, makes a positive profit
pij = (1/ε)p
m
j nj − wjnj > 0 for the monopoly price pmj , then the current
incumbent sets pj = εwj to prevent the others from entering the market.
Hence, the firm applies the mark-up rule with
ϕ(J)
.
= min
[
ε,
θ
θ + φ(J)− 1
]
> 1, ϕ′ < 0 for ϕ < ε.
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Economic integration (i.e. a higher J) decreases the mark-up factor ϕ through
heavier international competition. From this and (2)-(5) it follows that
wj = pj/ϕ(J) = C
1/θB
1−1/θ
j n
−1/θ
j ϕ(J), Rj = γn
1/θ
j pj,
pij =
[
ϕ(J)− 1]wjnj, ϕ(J) > 1, ϕ′ < 0 for ϕ < ε. (6)
(c) Technological change. Economy j is subject to technological change which
is characterized by a Poisson process qj as follows. During a short time
interval dτ , there is an innovation dqj = 1 with probability Λjdτ , and no
innovation dqj = 0 with probability 1− Λjdτ , where Λj is the arrival rate of
innovations in the research process. We assume that the arrival rate Λj is in
fixed proportion λ to the employment of researchers in the economy j, lj:
Λj = λlj, λ > 0. (7)
We denote the serial number of technology in economy k by tk. The
level of productivity in the production of intermediate good k, Bk(tk), is
determined by the currently most advanced technology tk. The invention of
a new technology raises tk by one and the level of productivity Bk(tk) by
ε > 1. This implies
Bk(tk) = Bk(0)ε
tk . (8)
Because the average growth rate in economy k is in fixed proportion (log ε)
to the arrival rate Λk = λlk and lk,
9 we can use research input lk as a proxy
of the growth rate of economy k.
(d) Employment and labour supply. Because each family can change its mem-
bers’ occupation from a worker to an researcher at some cost and the abilities
of all individuals in economy j differ, there is a decreasing and convex trans-
formation function between the supply of workers, Nj, and the supply of
researchers, Lj, as follows:
Nj = N(Lj), N
′ < 0, N ′′ < 0. (9)
Hence, more and more workers must be transformed in order to create one
more research input. A worker’s expected wage is equal to the wage wj times
9For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
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the likelihood of employment, nj/Nj:
wej
.
= (nj/Nj)wj, (10)
Because researchers are not unionized, they are always fully employed,
lj = Lj, (11)
and their expected wage is equal to the wage vj.
Because households must choose their combination (Lj, Nj) of labour sup-
ply before entering the labour market, this choice is based on the transfor-
mation function (9) and the expected wages (vj, w
e
j) which the household
takes as given. This equilibrium is found by maximizing expected income
vjLj +w
e
jNj = vjLj +w
e
jN(Lj) by Lj, which yields the first order condition
vj/w
e
j = −N ′(Lj). This condition, (9), (10) and (11) yield
− N
′(lj)
N(lj)
= − N
′(Lj)
N(Lj)
=
vj
wejNj
=
vj
wjnj
. (12)
4 Consumption and saving
Economy j contains a fixed number κ of similar households that are dynas-
tic families. Each family consist of both workers and researchers.10 The
utility for household ` ∈ {1, ..., κ} in economy j from an infinite stream of
consumption beginning at time T is given by
Uj(Cj`, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Cσj`e
−ρ(τ−T )dτ with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (13)
where τ is time, E the expectation operator, Cj` consumption, ρ the rate of
time preference and 1/(1− σ) is the constant rate of relative risk aversion.
Because only researchers are used in R&D, investment expenditure in
economy j is equal to labour cost vjlj, where lj is the researchers’ employment
and vj their wage. We assume, for simplicity, that households purchase only
shares of the firms operating in the same economy:
κ∑
`=1
Sj` = vjlj, (14)
10See footnote 6.
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where Sj` is saving by household ` in economy j. When household ` has
financed a successful R&D project, it acquires the right to a certain share of
profits the successful firm earns in the production of final goods. Since the
old producer is driven out of the market, all shares held in it lose their value.
We denote by sj` the true profit share of household ` when the uncertainty of
the outcome of the projects are taken into account. These shares throughout
all households in economy j sum up to one:
κ∑
`=1
sj` = 1. (15)
Following Wa¨lde (1999), we assume that the change in this share, dsj`, is
a function of the increment dqj of a Poisson process qj as:
dsj` = (ij` − sj`)dqj with ij` .= Sj`/(vjlj), (16)
where vjlj total investment expenditure in economy j and ij` the true in-
vestment share of household `. When a household does not invest in the
upcoming vintage, its share holdings are reduced to zero in the case of re-
search success dqj = 1. If it invests, then the amount of share holdings
depends on its relative investment in the vintage.
Labour income in economy j is equal to wages paid in production and
R&D, wjnj + vjlj. The total income of household ` ∈ {1, ..., κ} in economy
j, Aj`, consists of an equal share 1/κ of wages and rents wjnj + vjlj + Rjaj
and the share sj` of the profits of the intermediate-good firm, pij:
11
Aj`
.
= (vjlj + wjnj +Rjaj)/κ+ sj`pij. (17)
Because the price of the consumption good is normalized at unity, the budget
constraint of household ` in economy j is given by
Aj` = Cj` + Sj`, (18)
where Cj` is consumption and Sj` saving.
We denote the value of receiving a share sj` of the profits of the mo-
nopolists using current technology tj by Ω(sj`, tj), and the value of receiv-
ing a share ij` of the profits of the monopolists of the next generation by
11Because the consumption-good firms are subject to technology (1) with constant re-
turns to scale, in equilibrium they have no profits to be distributed to households.
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Ω(ij`, tj + 1). Household ` maximizes its utility (13) subject to stochastic
process (16) and the budget constraint (18) by its saving Sj`, given wages
(wj, vj), profits pij, employment (nj, lj) and the arrival rate of innovations
Λj. This maximization leads to the Bellman equation
12
ρΩ(sj`, tj) = max
Sj`
{
Cσj` + Λj[Ω(ij`, tj + 1)− Ω(sj`, tj)]
}
, (19)
where Cj` = Aj`−Sj` and Λj is determined by (7). The first order condition
associated with the Bellman equation (19) is given by
Λj
d
dSj`
[Ω(ij`, tj + 1)− Ω(sj`, tj)] = σCσ−1j` . (20)
We try the solution that consumption expenditure Cj` is a share
0 ≤ cj` ≤ 1 out of income Aj`, and the value function is of the form Ω =
(cj`Aj`)
σ/rj`, where the consumption-income ratio cj` and the (subjective)
interest rate rj` are independent of income Aj`. Inserting that solution into
(19) and (20), we obtain the following results for economy j (Appendix A).
First, every innovation that replaces technology tj by tj + 1 raises consump-
tion Cj and domestic output yj in economy j as follows:
Ctj+1/Ctj = ε1−1/θ > 1. (21)
Second, workers’ employment nj is determined by
nj = n(lj, J),
∂n
∂J
< 0,
∂
∂J
[
1
nj
∂n
∂lj
]
> 0 ⇔ ∂n
∂lj
< 0. (22)
Economic integration (i.e. the increase in J) intensifies competition from
abroad and thereby reduces workers’ employment nj.
5 Wage bargaining
In each economy j, the workers’ wage wj is determined by bargaining between
a union representing workers in economy j and a federation representing em-
ployers of these workers. These control the whole intermediate-good industry
inclusive of the possible entrants. We assume, for simplicity, that both the
12Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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labour union and the employed federation are risk neutral, have the same
rate of time preference % > 0, and their reference income is zero.13
Because workers differ in seniority, they face different probability of em-
ployment. The probability that a worker of seniority β is employed, when
the total rate of employment is nj/Nj, is therefore given by (see figure 1)
f(β)
nj
Nj
, f ′ < 0, f(0) > 1, f(Nj) < 1,
∫ Nj
0
f(β)dβ = Nj. (23)
The property f ′ < 0 tells that the more senior a worker (i.e. the smaller
β), the less likely he loses his job when the total rate of employment, nj/Nj,
falls. If all workers were homogeneous (i.e. f(β) ≡ 1), they all would have the
same probability nj/Nj of employment, as characterized by line aa. Because
senior workers (with a small β) have a higher probability of employment than
junior workers (with a high β), the function f must be decreasing. Because
the employment probability for a worker cannot be above one, the function
SS must be below one.
β
β
a an
N
N
j
j
j
f ( )
1 -
0
__
S
S
n
jN
j__
Figure 1: A worker’s expected employment.
If all Nj workers are unionized, then the median member of the union
is the worker of seniority Nj/2, his probability of employment is given by
f(Nj/2)nj/Nj, and his expected income by wjf(Nj/2)nj/Nj, which is also
the union’s instantaneous utility. The union attempts then to maximize the
expected value Uj of the stream of wjf(Nj/2)nj/Nj, while the federation
13See footnote 7.
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attempts to maximize the expected value Fj of the stream of employers’
profits pij, taking total consumption in the common market, C, as given.
Given the result (6) and (21) and the stochastic technological progress (see
section 3c), these targets take the form:14
Uj(lj, C) .= E
∫ ∞
0
e−%τwjf(Nj/2)
nj
Nj
dτ =
Bj(0)
1−1/θwjf(Nj/2)nj/Nj
B
1−1/θ
j [%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
> 0,
Fj(lj, C) .= E
∫ ∞
0
e−%τpijdτ =
Bj(0)
1−1/θpij
B
1−1/θ
j [%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
> 0. (24)
There is one-to-one correspondence from wj to lj through (6) and (22) as
wj = C
1/θB
1−1/θ
j n(lj, J)
−1/θϕ(J).
Hence, in the model of bargaining, wj can be replaced by lj as the instrument
of bargaining. The outcome of bargaining is then obtained through maxi-
mizing the Generalized Nash Product Uαjj F1−αjj , where constant αj ∈ (0, 1)
is relative union bargaining power, by lj, keeping C constant. This maxi-
mization proves (Appendix B):
Proposition 1 Workers’ and researchers’ employment are negatively depen-
dent, ∂n/∂lj < 0. Higher union power αj and economic integration (i.e. a
bigger J) promote R&D and growth, lj = Θ(αj, J), ∂Θ/∂αj > 0, ∂Θ/∂J > 0.
Union power raises workers’ wage wj but lowers their employment nj and
expected wage (= the wage times the employment rate) wej . With a lower
relative expected wage for a worker, more households choose to become re-
searchers rather than workers (i.e. lj increases). A higher number of re-
searchers promotes R&D and growth. Economic integration (i.e. a higher J)
decreases workers’ employment nj and their expected wage, more households
choose to become researchers (i.e. lj increases) and the growth rate increases.
6 Social welfare
The average level of productivity in the consumption-good sector is given by
B
.
=
[
1
J
J∑
k=1
B
1−1/θ
k
]θ/(θ−1)
.
(25)
14For this, see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 61.
12
Because there is symmetry throughout economies j = 1, .., J , there exists an
equilibrium with αj = α, lj = l and Bj = B. In that equilibrium, noting (7),
the average growth rate of consumption (= the arrival rate of jumps ε > 1
in the level of productivity in the consumption-good sector) is given by
Λ
.
=
∂B
∂Bk
Λk
∣∣∣∣
Bk=B
=
1
J
J∑
k=1
( B
Bk
)1/θ∣∣∣∣
Bk=B
Λk =
1
J
J∑
k=1
Λk = λl.
We denote the serial number of consumption technology by t. Choosing
B(0) = 1, we then obtain B = εt. Noting this, proposition 1 and results (1),
(3), (22) and (25), we can define consumption per economy in the common
market as follows:
C
J
= χ(l, J)
[
1
J
J∑
k=1
B
1−1/θ
k
]θ/(θ−1)
= J1/(θ−1)χ(l, J)B = J1/(θ−1)εtχ(l, J),
χ(l, J)
.
=
[
n(l, J)1−1/θ + γ
]θ/(θ−1)
> n,
∂χ
∂J
=
(χ
n
)1/θ ∂n
∂J
< 0,
∂χ
∂l
=
(χ
n
)1/θ ∂n
∂l
< 0,
1
χ
∂χ
∂l
=
(χ
n
)1/θ−1 1
n
∂n
∂l
. (26)
Differentiating the logarithm of the last equation and noting (22), we obtain
∂
∂J
[
1
χ
∂χ
∂l
]
=
+︷ ︸︸ ︷(
1− 1
θ
)[ 1
n
∂n
∂J
−
+︷︸︸︷
1
χ
∂χ
∂J
] +︷︸︸︷
1
χ
−︷︸︸︷
∂χ
∂l
+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
χ
(χ
n
)1/θ−1 +︷ ︸︸ ︷∂
∂J
[ 1
n
∂n
∂l
]
>
(
1− 1
θ
)[ 1
n
∂n
∂J
− 1
χ
(χ
n
)1/θ ∂n
∂J
]
1
χ
∂χ
∂l
=
(
1− 1
θ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[
1−
(n
χ
)1−1/θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
]
1
n︸︷︷︸
+
∂n
∂J︸︷︷︸
−
1
χ
∂χ
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
> 0. (27)
Because the number of households in the whole common market is constant
Jκ, then, given (13) and (26), the utility of the representative consumer in
the common market can be written as follows [cf. Cj` = C/(Jκ)]:
U = E
∫ ∞
T
( C
Jκ
)σ
e−ρ(τ−T )dτ = κ−σE
∫ ∞
T
Jσ/(θ−1)χ(l, J)σεσte−ρ(τ−T )dτ.
(28)
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we assume that the common
market is able to fully control union power α in its jurisdiction (e.g. through
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compulsory meadiation). The social planner in the common market then
maximizes social welfare (28) by α. Because the number of researchers l
depends on union power α through proposition 1, α can be replaced by lj = l
(which also proxies the growth rate) as the instrument of maximization.
To examine the optimal policy of integration, assume first that the com-
mon market can expand smoothly by taking small new members in. In such
a case, the social planner can use both lj and the size of the common market,
J , as policy instruments. Denoting the value of the state of technology t for
this planner by Υ(t), and noting proposition 1 and results (7) and (26), we
obtain the Bellman equation for integration policy as (constant κ−σ omitted):
ρΥ(t, J) = max
J, l
Q(l, J, t), where
Q .= Jσ/(θ−1)χ(l, J)σεσt + λl[Υ(t+ 1)−Υ(t)]. (29)
We define (J∗, l∗) = argmaxJ, lQ(l, J, t). This, (26) and (29) yield
J∗ = argmax
J
Q(l∗, J, t) = argmax
J
[
Jσ/(θ−1)χ(l∗, J)
]
= argmax
J
[C/(Jκ)]l=l∗ .
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 A common market should expand as long as this increases
consumption per capita, C/(Jκ).
If the common market can control its growth rate through union power, then
the integration of new members can be wholly determined by the maximiza-
tion of current consumption with no concern of economic growth.
Second, consider labour union policy in an expanding common market.
We can then exploit the model above on the assumption that the size J of
the common market is exogenous. The Bellman equation for this policy is
ρΥ(t, J) = max
l
Q(l, J, t). (30)
Noting (29), the first-order condition corresponding to (30) is given by
∂Q
∂l
(l, J, t) = σJσ/(θ−1)χσεσt
1
χ
∂χ
∂l
+ λ[Υ(t+ 1)−Υ(t)] = 0. (31)
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We consider the situation in the neighbourhood of the optimal common mar-
ket for which
J = argmax
J
Q = argmax
J
[
Jσ/(θ−1)χσ(l, J)
]
. (32)
The interpretation of this is the following. The common market adjusts first
its size J to the optimal level by accepting new members. After this, it starts
to consider what to do with union power.
From (26), (27), (31) and (32) it follows that
∂2Q
∂l∂J
= σεσt
1
χ
∂χ
∂l
∂
∂J
[
Jσ/(θ−1)χσ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≈0
+ σJσ/(θ−1)χσεσt︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂
∂J
[ 1
χ
∂χ
∂l
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0.
Given this and the second-order condition ∂2Q/∂l2 < 0, the comparative
statics of the first-order condition (31) yields:
Proposition 3 If the common market is close to its optimal size, then its
expansion (i.e. a bigger J) promotes R&D and speeds up growth:
dl
dJ
= − ∂
2Q
∂l∂J
/
∂2Q
∂l2
> 0. (33)
Intensified competition with integration decreases the demand for workers’
labour (cf. (22)). There are then more resources for R&D and growth.
Finally, noting proposition 1 and result (33), we obtain
dα
dJ
=
(
dl
dJ
− ∂Θ
∂J
)/
∂Θ
∂αj
< 0 ⇔ dl
dJ
>
∂Θ
∂J
⇔ J
l
dl
dJ
>
J
l
∂Θ
∂J
, (34)
where (J/l)dl/dJ is the elasticity of R&D with respect to the variety of prod-
ucts when union power α is not used as a control variable, and (J/l)∂Θ/∂J
is the elasticity of R&D with respect to the variety of products when union
power α is used as a control variable. These results can be rephrased as:
Proposition 4 If the competition effect of integration (i.e. the direct effect
of J on Θ) is strong enough, ∂Θ/∂J > dl/dJ , then integration causes political
pressure to weaken labour unions (i.e. to decrease α). If it is weak enough,
∂Θ/∂J < dl/dJ , then there is political pressure to strengthen labour unions.
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If the increase in international competition due to economic integration in-
creases R&D more than what is desirable from the social point of view, then
excess R&D must be eliminated by weakening labour unions. If vice versa,
then R&D must be raised to the socially desirable level by strengthening
labour unions. The elasticity rule (34) can be used to specify the necessity
of labour market regulation/deregulation, if there are good empirical proxies
for union power α and the variety of products, J .15
7 Conclusions
This paper examines a common market with the following properties. First,
the expansion of the common market increases the variety of products and
intensifies competition in the goods market. Second, growth is generated by
creative destruction. A firm creating the latest technology through a suc-
cessful R&D project crowds the other firms with older technologies out of
the market so that they lose their value. Third, households save by buying
shares in R&D projects. Fourth, households decide whether their members
are researchers who are used in R&D, or workers who are employed in produc-
tion. A change of occupation involves a cost. Fifth, direct subsidy to R&D
is commonly non-feasible. Sixth, wages are determined by union-employer
bargaining. Seventh, workers differ in seniority. The results are as follows.
Union power has a positive impact on the growth rate, but a negative
impact on current income. With higher union power, workers’ wages increase,
but their employment and expected wage falls, and more households choose to
become researchers rather than workers. With lower employment for workers,
current output and income is smaller. On the other hand, with a larger
15The following papers proxy α by the unionization rate (i.e. the ratio of unionized to
all workers). Addison and Wagner (1994) find a positive cross-sectional correlation, but
Menezes-Filho et.al. (1998) find little correlation in a panel of firms, between R&D and
the unionization rate in the UK. On the other hand, Connolly et.al. (1986), Hirsch (1990,
1992), Bronars et.al. (1994) find a negative cross-sectional correlation between these in the
USA, and Betts et.al. (2001) in Canada. Hence, the results seem to be institution-specific.
There are, however, good reasons to believe that unionization rate is not a proper proxy
for union power in wage bargaining. In many (mainly European) countries, the contract
made by the representative union is extended to cover the whole industry. In such a case,
the unionization rate is insignificant. In some other countries (e.g. USA, Canada), unions
can make agreements only for their members and a unionized worker can be easily replaced
by a non-unionized worker. In such a case, the unionization rate may affect R&D.
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number of researchers, there will be more innovations and a higher growth
rate in future. The welfare effect of union power is positive (negative) if the
latter effect through growth dominates (is dominated by) the former effect
through employment. Union power and the growth rate are socially optimal
when the growth and employment effects exactly outweigh each other. When
the common market takes new members, R&D and the growth rate increase.
In such a case, workers’ expected wage falls, more households choose to
become researchers rather than workers, and R&D increases.
The stronger the unions, the more there is R&D and the higher the growth
rate. Union power raises workers’ wage but decreases their employment. Em-
ployment however falls so much relative to the wage increase that workers’
expected wage (= the wage times the employment rate) falls, more house-
holds choose to become researchers rather than workers and a higher number
of researchers promotes R&D and economic growth.
If a common market can fully control union power in its jurisdiction, it
should expand as long as this increases its consumption per capita. Because
it can control its growth rate through union power, the integration of new
members can be wholly judged by the maximization of current consumption
with no concern of economic growth.
If economic integration intensifies competition in the product markets
much enough, then integration causes political pressure to labour market
deregulation. In such a case, R&D after integration is higher than what is
desirable from the social point of view, and excess R&D must be eliminated
by weakening labour unions. If economic integration intensifies competition
only very moderately, then there is political pressure to labour market regu-
lation. In such a case, R&D must be raised to the socially desirable level by
strengthening labour unions. If there are good empirical proxies for union
power and the variety of products, then there is an elasticity rule by which
the decision between deregulation and regulation in the labour market can
be judged.
By the results of this paper, we can judge the following. Intensified
competition in the goods markets due to economic integration is the likely
cause for the observed deunionization during the last two decades.
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Appendix A
Let us denote variables depending on technology tj by superscript tj.
Since according to (17) income A
tj
j` depends directly on the share s
tj
j`, we
denote A
tj
j`(s
tj
j`). Guessing that cj` is invariant across technologies, we obtain
C
tj
j` = cj`A
tj
j`(s
tj
j`), S
tj
j` = (1− cj`)Atjj`(stjj`). (35)
The share in the next producer tj + 1 is determined by investment under
technology tj, s
tj+1
j` = i
tj
j`. The value functions are then given by
Ω(s
tj
j`, tj) = (C
tj
j`)
σ/rj`, Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1) = (C
tj+1
j` )
σ/rj`. (36)
Given this, we obtain
∂Ω(s
tj
j`, tj)/∂S
tj
j` = 0. (37)
From (16), (17), (35) and (36) it follows that
∂i
tj
j`
∂S
tj
j`
=
1
v
tj
j l
tj
j
,
∂[A
tj+1
j` (i
tj
j`)]
∂i
tj
j`
=
∂[A
tj+1
j` (s
tj+1
j` )]
∂s
tj+1
j`
= pi
tj+1
j ,
∂Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j`
=
σ
rj`
(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1 ∂C
tj+1
j`
∂A
tj+1
j`
∂A
tj+1
j`
∂i
tj
j`
∂i
tj
j`
∂S
tj
j`
= σ
cj`(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1pitj+1j
rj`v
tj
j l
tj
j
.
(38)
We focus on a stationary equilibrium where the allocation of labour,
(l
tj
j , n
tj
j ), is invariant across technologies. Given (9), this implies
l
tj
j = lj, n
tj
j = nj, Nj = N(Lj) = N(lj). (39)
We assume that households in economy j take aggregate consumption in the
whole common market, C, as exogenously given. Given this and (6), it then
follows that
w
tj+1
j /w
tj
j = (B
tj+1
j /B
tj
j )
1−1/θ.
Noting this, (8), (17), (35) and (39), we obtain
C
tj+1
j` /C
tj
j` = A
tj+1
j` /A
tj
j` = v
tj+1
j /v
tj
j = pi
tj+1
j /pi
tj
j
= w
tj+1
j /w
tj
j = (B
tj+1
j /B
tj
j )
1−1/θ = ε1−1/θ > 1. (40)
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Inserting (7), (36) and (40) into the equation (19), we obtain
0 = (ρ+ Λj)Ω(s
tj
j`, tj)− (Ctjj`)σ − ΛjΩ(itjj`, tj + 1)
= (ρ+ Λj)(C
tj
j`)
σ/rj` − (Ctjj`)σ − Λj(Ctj+1j` )σ/rj
= (C
tj
j`)
σ[ρ+ Λj − rj` − ε(1−1/θ)σΛj]/rj`
= (C
tj
j`)
σ
{
ρ− rj` + [1− ε(1−1/θ)σ]λlj
}
/rj`.
This implies
rj = rj` = ρ+ [1− ε(1−1/θ)σ]λlj > 0. (41)
From (12) it follows that
v
tj
j /(w
tj
j nj) = −N ′(lj)/N(lj). (42)
Inserting (6), (7) and (37)-(42) into (20) yields
0 = λlj
∂Ω(i
tj
j`, tj + 1)
∂S
tj
j`
− σ(Ctjj`)σ−1 = λljσcj`
(C
tj+1
j` )
σ−1pitjj
rjv
tj
j lj
− σ(Ctjj`)σ−1
= σ(C
tj
j`)
σ−1
[
λcj`ε
(1−1/θ)(σ−1) pi
tj
j
rjv
tj
j
− 1
]
and
cj` = ε
(1/θ−1)(σ−1) rjv
tj
j
λpi
tj
j
= ε(1/θ−1)(σ−1)
ρ/λ+ [1− ε(1−1/θ)σ]lj
(ε− 1)N(lj)/[−N ′(lj)]
.
= c(lj),
dc
dl
=
{
1− ε(1−1/θ)σ
ρ/λ+ [1− ε(1−1/θ)σ]lj︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
N ′′
N ′
− N
′
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
}
cj
>
<
0. (43)
Given (6), (14), (15), (17), (35), (42) and (43), we obtain
vjlj
1− c(lj) =
1
1− c(lj)
κ∑
`=1
Sj` =
κ∑
`=1
Sj`
1− c(lj) =
κ∑
`=1
Sj`
1− cj` =
κ∑
`=1
Aj`
= vjlj + wjnj +Rjaj + pij = vjlj + (1 + γn
1/θ−1
j )ϕ(J)wjnj,
which is equivalent to vjlj = [1/c(lj) − 1]ϕ(J)(1 + γn1/θ−1j )wjnj. From this
and (12) it follows that
ϕ(J) (1 + γn
1/θ−1
j )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
=
vjlj/(wjnj)
1/c(lj)− 1 =
−(N ′/N)lj
1/c(lj)− 1 =
cj(lj)lj[−N ′(lj)]
[1− cj(lj)]N(lj)
.
= δ(lj),
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where, given (43), the sign of the derivative δ′ is ambiguous. This equation
and (6) show that δ > ϕ > 1. Solving for nj, we obtain
nj = n(lj, J) = γ
1/(1−1/θ)[δ(lj)− ϕ(J)]1/(1/θ−1)ϕ(J)1/(1−1/θ).
Differentiating the logarithm of this equation totally, we obtain
dnj
nj
=
1
1− 1/θ
[
ϕ′(J)
ϕ(J)
dJ − δ
′(lj)dlj − ϕ′(J)
δ(lj)− ϕ(J)
]
.
Noting this and (6), we obtain partial derivatives
∂n
∂lj
=
1
1/θ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
n(lj, J)
δ(lj)− ϕ(J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
δ′(lj) < 0 ⇔ δ′ > 0,
∂n
∂J
=
ϕ′(J)
1− 1/θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
n(lj, J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[
1
ϕ(J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
1
δ(lj)− ϕ(J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
< 0,
∂
∂J
[
1
nj
∂n
∂lj
]
=
ϕ′
1/θ − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
1
(δ − ϕ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
δ′ > 0 ⇔ δ′ > 0 ⇔ ∂n
∂lj
< 0.
Appendix B
Given this, (6), (9), (11), (22) and (24), the logarithm of the Generalized
Nash product Uαj F1−αj takes the form
Γj(lj, C, αj, θ)
.
= log
[Uαj F1−αj ] = αj log Uj + (1− αj) log Fj
= αj log
[
wjf(Nj/2)(nj/Nj)B
1/θ−1
j
]
+ (1− αj) log
[
pijB
1/θ−1
j
]
− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]
= αj log
[
wjf(Nj/2)(nj/Nj)B
1/θ−1
j
]
+ (1− αj) log
[
wjnjB
1/θ−1
j
]
− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj] + ∆
= log
[
wjnjB
1/θ−1
j
]
+ αj log f(Nj/2)− αj log Nj
− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]+∆
= (1− 1/θ) log nj + αj log f(Nj/2)− αj log Nj
− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]+∆
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= (1− 1/θ) log n(lj, J) + αj log f
(
N(lj/2)
)− αj log N(lj)
− log[%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj]+∆
with %+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj > 0, (44)
where ∆ denotes terms that are independent of nj and lj. Because a loga-
rithm is an increasing transformation, the outcome of bargaining is obtained
through maximizing the function (44) by lj, taking C as given. Given (9),
(23), (44), ε > 1 and θ > 1, this leads to the first-order condition
∂Γj
∂lj
= αj
[ −︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
f ′(N(lj)/2)
f(N(lj)/2)
− 1
N(lj)
] −︷ ︸︸ ︷
N ′(lj)+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ε1−1/θ − 1)λ
%+ (1− ε1−1/θ)λlj
+
(
1− 1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) 1
n(lj, J)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂n
∂lj
(lj, J) = 0. (45)
This implies ∂n/∂lj < 0. Furthermore, the equation (45) defines the function
lj = Θ(αj, J). Given (9), (22), (23) and θ > 1, it shows that
∂2Γj
∂lj∂αj
=
(
1
2
f ′
f
− 1
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
)
N ′︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂J
=
(
1− 1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) ∂
∂J
[
1
nj
∂n
∂lj
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0.
Given this and the second-order condition ∂2Γj/∂l
2
j < 0, the comparative
statics of the first-order condition (45) yields the function lj = Θ(αj) with
∂Θ
∂αj
= − ∂
2Γj
∂lj∂αj
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
> 0 and
∂Θ
∂J
= − ∂
2Γj
∂lj∂J
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
> 0.
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